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Abstract
Building on Nozick’s invariantism about objectivity, I propose to define scientific objectivity
in terms of counterfactual independence. I will argue that such a counterfactual independence
account is (a) able to overcome the decisive shortcomings of Nozick’s original invariantism
and (b) applicable to three paradigmatic kinds of scientific objectivity (that is, objectivity as
replication, objectivity as robustness, and objectivity as Mertonian universalism).
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1. Introduction: From invariantism to the counterfactual independence account of
scientific objectivity
In this paper, I will argue for an account of scientific objectivity, according to which
objectivity can be defined in terms of counterfactual independence.
This counterfactual independence account is inspired by Nozick’s invariantism
about objectivity: “an objective fact is one that is invariant under all admissible trans-
formations” (Nozick 2001: 82). To pick one of Nozick’s own examples, the shape of a
bottle is objective iff the shape remains the same (that is, invariant) if the bottle is
rotated or moved in different (actual or possible) ways (Nozick 2001: 78).
However, Nozick’s invariantism suffers from at least three shortcomings:
1. Nozick does not provide an explication of the central modal notion of invariance.
He merely illustrates the notion of invariance by way of example (such as the bot-
tle example above).
2. Nozick distinguishes between invariant facts (such as the shape of a bottle) and
varying facts (for instance, different locations of a bottle). But his account does
not restrict which kinds of facts may play these ‘roles’. This lack of restriction
gives rise to a worry: objectivity is quite cheap. For instance, my political convic-
tions would turn out to be objective because they would remain the same if the
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location of a grain of sand on Mars changes or were to change. This sounds
implausible.
3. Nozick’s choice of examples suffers from a one-sided diet, because all of his elab-
orate examples are from physics (Nozick 2001: 77–8, 82–7). Examples from other
sciences are sparse (for instance, Nozick 2001: 90–1, 95, 108). Such a one-sided
diet is dissatisfying if one is after a general explication of scientific objectivity, as
opposed to objectivity in physics only.
These shortcomings motivate three tasks:
• to provide an explication of invariance (explication task),
• to propose a restriction on which kinds of facts can play the role of invariant and
varying facts (restriction task), and
• to discuss examples of objectivity that generalize from physics to other sciences
(generalizability task).
To address these tasks, I will make an assumption. Following the mainstream in the
literature on scientific objectivity (for instance, among many others, Rorty 1980; Daston
and Galison 2007), I will assume that scientific objectivity is an epistemic notion. It is a
notion characterizing empirical evidence and evidential support relations (i.e. justifica-
tory relations) between a body of evidence and some hypothesis.1 I distinguish scientific
objectivity from the (non-epistemic) notion of ontological objectivity (that is, mind-
independent existence, as referred to in various debates on realism, such as scientific,
moral, and mathematical realism). Ontological objectivity is not my topic in this
paper, but one advantage of the counterfactual independence account consists in that
it points towards a way of understanding this kind of objectivity (see section 5).
Assuming that scientific objectivity is an epistemic notion, I will argue that the coun-
terfactual independence account successfully accomplishes the three above-mentioned
tasks when defining scientific objectivity as follows:
Evidence E is scientifically objective in relation to a given contrast class of scientists
and methods if and only if:
1. Independence Condition: E is counterfactually independent of the scientists, or of
the methods they use.
2. Absence Condition: There is no evidence of defeaters.
In this paper, I will explicate and motivate the Independence Condition and the
Absence Condition.
More precisely, the plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I will explicate how the
Independence Condition of the counterfactual independence account solves the explication
task and the restriction task. In section 3, I will address the generalizability task by arguing
that the Independence Condition is applicable to three paradigmatic examples of objectivity
that can be found in various sciences, not only in physics. In section 4, I will articulate and
motivate the Absence Condition. Section 5 provides a conclusion and an outlook on three
advantages of the counterfactual independence account.
My main goal in this paper is fairly modest: to defend the counterfactual independ-
ence account as a theory of scientific objectivity that meets the three tasks introduced
1My focus is on an epistemic notion of objectivity in scientific contexts. This focus does not exclude that
an epistemic notion of objectivity is also used in non-scientific contexts, such as juridical contexts.
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above. It is not my ambition to assess the merit of the counterfactual independence
account relative to alternative accounts of scientific objectivity in any great detail. For
brevity’s sake, I will leave this ambitious project to another paper.
However, I would like to highlight a feature of the counterfactual independence
account in order to situate it in the literature on objectivity. The counterfactual inde-
pendence account provides a unifying account of objectivity in science, since it captures
different kinds of objectivity on the basis of a single general, precise and informative
explication of what makes these different kinds of objectivity objective, or so I argue.
This unificationist spirit aims at an alternative to other approaches to scientific object-
ivity, according to which there is no general, precise and informative story to tell (such
as, among others, Douglas 2004; Hacking 2015).
2. Explicating the Independence Condition
In this section, I will argue that the Independence Condition allows me to meet the
explication task and the restriction task.
Regarding the explication task, I propose to explicate Nozick’s undefined modal
notion of invariance as counterfactual independence. It is useful to introduce the notion
of counterfactual dependence first in order to define counterfactual independence in a
second step.
Fact A counterfactually depends on fact B iff the following counterfactual condi-
tionals are true: (1) if B were the case, then A would be the case, and (2) if B were
not the case, then A would not be the case.
This notion of dependence is familiar from counterfactual theories of causation and
explanation (for instance, Lewis 1973; Woodward 2003).2 We are now in a position to
define what it means that A does not counterfactually depend on B, or equivalently, and
to use my preferred label, what it means that A is counterfactually independent of B:
A is counterfactually independent of B iff the following counterfactual condi-
tionals are true: (1) if B were the case, then A would be the case, and (2) if B
were not the case, then A would (still) be the case.
Furthermore, I take it to be useful to attribute the following connected features to
counterfactual independence:
• Independence is relational. The sentence “A is independent” does not make sense
or is at least incomplete. Only “A is independent of B (or, in relation to B)” is
complete and meaningful. Hence, A might be independent of B but not of
some other fact C.
• Independence requires a contrast class. Suppose A is independent of B. Asserting
such independencies (explicitly or implicitly) relies on a relevant contrast class
whose elements specify the possible alternatives to B, or possible variations of B
(van Fraassen 1980; similarly, Lipton 2004). Thereby, the contrast class indicates
which antecedents matter for the counterfactual conditionals if we want to assert
that A is independent of B. In the simplest case, the contrast class of B is {not-B}.
But, as I will illustrate in section 3, in realistic examples of scientific objectivity the
relevant contrast class tends to have more members.
2I will remain neutral between different semantics for counterfactual conditionals.
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• Independence is comparative. Contrast classes may differ, for instance, in how
many (and which) elements they have (Nozick 2001: 87, 99). If so, then some
fact A might be independent of fact B1 given the small contrast class {B2}.
Some other fact A* might display independence of B1 given a contrast class
with more elements, such as the class {B2; B3} that has {B2} as a proper subset.
In such a case, we can compare A*’s and A’s independencies directly and state
that A* is independent of more varying facts than A.3
If objectivity is defined in terms of independence, as I propose, then objectivity
inherits these three features.
Although the notion of counterfactual independence (and its synonyms such as sta-
bility and resilience) has not been explicitly used to define scientific objectivity, it is at
the heart of various attempts to capture other central concepts in the philosophy of sci-
ence, such as laws of nature (see, for instance, Skyrms 1980; Lange 2009; see also, at
least implicitly, Nozick 2001: 85–6).
Let me now turn to the restriction task. Assuming that scientific objectivity is an epi-
stemic notion (see section 1), I propose the following restriction on the kinds of facts
that are counterfactually independent of one another: the invariant facts are facts con-
cerning empirical evidence (for some hypothesis), whereas the (counterfactually) vary-
ing facts concern (a) the different (possible) scientists (or groups of scientists) who do
the research to obtain the evidence, and/or (b) the different methods scientists use
(illustrations will follow in section 3).
Merging my answers to the explication task and the restriction task, we arrive
at the Independence Condition, according to which evidence E is counterfactually
independent of the scientists, or of the methods they use. The Independence
Condition provides a more restrictive and more precise explication of the key idea
of Nozick’s invariantism: an objective fact is no longer understood as some arbitrary
fact “that is invariant under all admissible transformations” (Nozick 2001: 82);
instead, an objective fact is defined more restrictively as a fact about empirical evi-
dence that is counterfactually independent of scientists that produce it or the methods
that they use.
3. Applying the Independence Condition to three kinds of objectivity in science
Now, I will take up the generalization task by applying the Independence Condition to
three kinds of objectivity that occur frequently in the (experimental) sciences, not just
in physics. I will argue that the Independence Condition captures at least three paradig-
matic kinds of objectivity: objectivity as replication, objectivity as robustness, and
objectivity as Mertonian universalism.4
The first kind of objectivity – objectivity as replication – consists in the successful
replication of experimental results that serve as evidence. That is, a scientist S2 (or,
more realistically, a group of scientists) is able to replicate the experimental result E
of another scientist S1 (or another group of scientists) by using the same method M
3Another scenario is possible: A* is independent of more varying facts than A, but the contrast class of A
is not a proper subset of the contrast class of A*. This is a less interesting scenario, because it does not allow
a direct comparison of A*’s and A’s independencies.
4I will present these kinds of objectivity in a ‘stylized’ way: that is, I will work with an abstract description
of each kind. I will not provide detailed case studies for each kind.
4 Alexander Reutlinger
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that S1 applied.
5 That is, in replication cases, the varying facts concern different scien-
tists, not the methods used (because S1 and S2 use the same method M).
The counterfactual independence account captures objectivity as replication in the
following manner appealing to the Independence Condition: evidence E, obtained by
using experimental method M, is objective relative to the contrast class {scientist S1; sci-
entist S2} iff obtaining E is independent of whether S1 or S2 applies method M – that is,
the following two counterfactual conditionals have to be true: (1) if S1 used experimen-
tal method M, then E would be the experimental result, and (2) if S2 used M, then E
would also be the experimental result.
Objectivity as robustness, the second kind of objectivity, consists in establishing that
an experimental result, evidence E, is robust. That is, different (groups of) scientists are
able to achieve the same result in their labs by using different methods.6 That is, in case
of robustness, the varying facts mainly concern the methods being used; the varying
facts might also concern the scientists (or a group of scientists), but it is possible
that a single scientist (or a group of scientists) arrives at robust research results by
applying different methods. I will apply the counterfactual independence account to
a type of robustness where the varying facts include methods and scientists.
According to the Independence Condition, we can capture objectivity as robustness
as follows: experimental result E is objective in relation to the contrast class {scientist
S1; scientist S2; method M1; method M2} iff (1) if S1 were to use M1, then E would
be the result, and (2) if S2 were to use M2, then E would also be the result (or some
equivalent piece of evidence E’ that can be mapped onto the result E of applying M1).
Objectivity as Mertonian universalism – the third kind – is the requirement that cer-
tain features of scientists should not matter when they assess the evidence. For instance, a
scientist’s nationality or social class should not matter for this activity. Merton famously
expresses this point as the rule of “universalism” that is part of the “ethos of science”:
The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the lists of science is not to depend
on the personal or social attributes of their protagonist; his race, nationality, reli-
gion, class, and personal qualities are as such irrelevant. (Merton 1942 [1973]: 270)
Different expressions of universalism can also be found in other prominent places in
the literature.7
Is the counterfactual independence account able to capture universalism? In the con-
text of this paper, universalism might be best understood as an additional constraint on
other kinds of objectivity, such as objectivity as replication and objectivity as robustness.
According to the counterfactual independence account, objectivity as universalism con-
sists in adding further elements to the contrast class. This strategy for describing uni-
versalism applies to both objectivity as replication and objectivity as robustness.
Suppose that two scientists S1 and S2 differ in certain features F1 and F2, in their
“personal or social attributes” (Merton 1942 [1973]). For instance, two scientists
might differ with respect to their nationality, social class, gender, the sponsors funding
their research (for instance, public funding versus industry funding), and so on.
In the case of objectivity as replication, Mertonian universalism simply enlarges the
relevant contrast class; it becomes {scientist S1; scientist S2; feature F1; feature F2}, and
5See Carnap (1932: 446), Popper (1934: 18–19), Rorty (1980: 333–42), Shapin and Schaffer (1985: 59–
60); and more recently Douglas (2004: 462) and Lloyd and Schweizer (2014: 2069–70).
6See Carnap (1932: 446–7); in the current literature, see Douglas (2004: 458) and Wimsatt (2007: Ch. 4).
7For instance, Weber (1949: 58), Longino (1990: 76–81), Daston (1992: 599), Daston and Galison (1992:
98; 2007: 121); see also Nozick (2001: 96).
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the resulting conditionals are (1) if S1 with feature F1 used experimental method M,
then E would be the experimental result, and (2) if S2 with feature F2 used experimental
method M, then E would also be the experimental result.
In the case of objectivity as robustness, the enlarged ‘universalist’ contrast class is
{scientist S1; scientist S2; feature F1; feature F2; method M1; method M2}, while the rele-
vant conditionals are: (1) if S1 with feature F1 were to use M1, then E would be the
result, and (2) if S2 with feature F2 were to use M2, then E would also be the result.
I take all three kinds of objectivity to be representative, as they are perceived as being
widespread and paradigmatic in the literature on objectivity in philosophy and history
of science. Of course, there might be further kinds of objectivity in science, as indicated
in the recent literature in philosophy and history of science: for instance, “structural
objectivity” (Daston and Galison 2007; Padovani et al. 2015), objectivity as different
kinds of “witnessing” in science (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 55–65), and objectivity
as expert agreement in the context of assessment reports (such as the IPCC report,
see Oppenheimer et al. 2019). For this reason, I take it to be a fruitful task for future
research to explore whether the counterfactual independence account can also be
applied to further kinds of objectivity.
In sum, I have argued for the claim that the Independence Condition applies to three
pervasive kinds of scientific objectivity. This result helps to address the generalizability
task, because all three kinds of objectivity can be found in various (experimental)
sciences, not merely in physics. Moreover, applying the Independence Condition to
the three kinds of objectivity illustrates that independence is relational (because each
kind of objectivity identifies certain facts relative to which the evidence is objective),
that stating independencies requires a contrast class (because a relevant contrast class
has to be chosen) and that independence has a comparative character (because the
kinds of objectivity suggest contrast classes with a different number of members).
4. Motivating the Absence Condition
The counterfactual independence account, as presented in section 1, also rests on a
second necessary condition: the Absence Condition. According to this condition, we
need to be aware of the fact that claims about independencies (required by the
Independence Condition) are defeasible and, moreover, that objectivity requires that
there be no evidence of defeaters. Consider two examples of defeaters for illustration.
For simplicity’s sake, I will focus on objectivity as replication in these examples.
First, suppose that scientist S1 first learns that a fellow scientist S2 has successfully
replicated her experimental study. She rightly takes this new information to be an indi-
cation of scientific objectivity. Then, however, S1 also learns that S2 has been working
with a method that is known to be highly unreliable. Hence, the ‘replication’ was merely
a matter of luck. This second piece of information plays the role of a defeater, as it
makes S1 considerably less confident that the (seeming) replication establishes the
objectivity of the empirical results of her own study (for a historical case study, see
Daston and Galison 2007: 11–16, 154–61; Reutlinger 2020: section 3.1).
Second, imagine that S1 learns that S2 failed to replicate the experimental result E of
her original empirical study. S1 counts this information as indicating a failure of object-
ivity. But imagine that S1 then obtains evidence that S2 is funded by a company (whose
non-epistemic interests are in conflict with the result E of her original study) and that S2
has omitted a relevant part of the data (for real cases of biased research, see Oreskes and
Conway 2010; Reutlinger 2020: section 3.2). For S1, the second piece of information is
defeating evidence: now, S1 has a good reason not to treat the result of S2’s study as
undermining the objectivity of her original study. Whether her original study did
6 Alexander Reutlinger
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indeed produce objective evidence depends on whether it will be successfully replicated
in the future.
Both examples suggest that claims about counterfactual independence are defeasible.
For this reason, a proponent of the counterfactual independence account should
demand that there be no evidence of defeaters. This is the second necessary condition
– the Absence Condition – I impose on scientific objectivity.8
5. Conclusion and outlook
I have proposed the counterfactual independence account and I have argued that this
account is able to overcome the shortcomings of Nozick’s invariantism. For this reason
alone, I believe it is an account of scientific objectivity that deserves further discussion.
Another attractive feature of the counterfactual independence account consists in the
fact that it provides a unificationist approach to objectivity (as outlined in section 1):
that is, it is designed to provide an alternative to other approaches in the historical
and philosophical literature, according to which there is no general, precise and inform-
ative account of scientific objectivity. To advance the unificationist project, it will be
fruitful to apply the counterfactual independence account to further kinds of objectivity
(see section 3 for examples).9
Finally, let me stress three advantageous and fruitful consequences of the counterfac-
tual independence account for future research.
First, the account explains why scientist strive for objectivity: valuing objectivity is
simply a plea for more evidence, for more evidence from different sources (from differ-
ent scientists and/or methods). Hence, if scientists care about empirical evidence, it is
not surprising that they value objectivity. It might be fruitful to elaborate this idea on
the basis of extant accounts of empirical confirmation (such as Bayesian confirmation
theory, frequentist hypothesis testing and likelihoodism).
Second, the counterfactual independence account can be adopted by both scientific
realists and scientific anti-realists, because objectivity is characterized by observable
facts (facts about evidence, scientists, methods, and the absence or presence of defea-
ters). Hence, the account I propose is neutral with respect to the persistent disagree-
ment about scientific realism. I take this to be an advantage of defining objectivity in
terms of the counterfactual independence account.
Third, although I have focused on scientific objectivity as an epistemic notion, the
counterfactual independence account also opens up a novel way to understand onto-
logical objectivity. Suppose that some fact A is ontologically objective – that is, A exists
mind-independently. Proponents of the counterfactual independence account might
adopt the following approach to ontological objectivity: A is ontologically objective rela-
tive to the contrast class {there are mental states concerned with A; there are no mental
states concerned with A} iff (1) if there were mental states concerned with A, then A
would obtain, and (2) if there were no mental states concerned with A, then A
would still obtain. Surely, this is not the final word on ontological objectivity but it
8Whether the Absence Condition is indeed satisfied has to be determined on the level of analyzing con-
crete case studies exemplifying the ‘stylized’ kinds of objectivity discussed in section 3. It is, however, not
my goal to provide such an analysis in this paper (I have done this elsewhere; see Reutlinger 2020).
9Objectivity as “virtual witnessing” (Shapin and Schaffer 1985: 60–5) and as expert agreement in the
context of assessment reports (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Oppenheimer et al. 2019) are particularly chal-
lenging kinds of objectivity. This is the case because the methods scientists use do not consist in conducting
experiments but instead in assessing and understanding the evidence as it is presented in scientific publica-
tions. To explore whether the counterfactual independence account applies to such cases is a project worth
undertaking.
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is a direction worth exploring – a direction that might spark a debate among philoso-
phers of science and metaphysicians.10
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